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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

BREAKING THE MYTHS: PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGE CAPS
INTRODUCTION
Your chance of dying due to medical error is one in ten. 1
According to a John Hopkins study, more than 250,000 people in the United
States die every year because of medical negligence, making it the third leading
cause of death after heart disease and cancer. 2 Whether individual doctors or
“the system” is to blame, this means nearly ten percent of all deaths are due to
medical error. 3 Further, according to a nationwide survey conducted by the
National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, twenty-one
percent of patients report experience with medical errors. 4 Therefore, nearly one
in four patients report an injury due to medical mistake. These medical errors
often have “lasting impact on the patient’s physical health, emotional health,
financial well-being, or family relationships.” 5 With injury or death due to a
party’s negligence comes expensive and lengthy litigation. In an effort to lower
costs, many states have introduced sweeping tort reform against medical
malpractice options. These reform plans frequently include caps on plaintiffs’
noneconomic damages.
First, this Note examines an overview of noneconomic damages. Next, this
Note focuses on the constitutionality of noneconomic damage caps. While this
Note does not go into specifics of the constitutional debate of noneconomic
damage caps, many other articles have probed the topic. 6 The discussion on the
constitutionality of noneconomic damage caps includes discussions on the
1. Martin A. Makary & Michael Daniel, Medical error – the third leading cause of death in
the US, BMJ (May 3, 2016), https://www.bmj.com/content/353/bmj.i2139.
2. Study Suggests Medical Errors Now Third Leading Cause of Death in the U.S., JOHNS
HOPKINS MED. (May 3, 2016), https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/media/releases/study_sug
gests_medical_errors_now_third_leading_cause_of_death_in_the_us (discussing death rates in the
United States).
3. Id.
4. New Survey Finds 21 Percent of Americans Report Personal Experience with Medical
Errors, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT (Sept. 28, 2017), http://www.ihi.org/about/news/
Documents/IHIPressRelease_Patient_Safety_Survey_Sept28_17.pdf.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., David F. Maron, Statutory Damage Caps: Analysis of the Scope of Right to Jury
Trial and the Constitutionality of Mississippi Statutory Caps on Noneconomic Damages, 32 MISS.
C. L. REV. 109, 110 (2013); Carol J. Miller & Joseph Weidhaas, Medical Malpractice Noneconomic
Caps Unconstitutional, 69 J. MO. B. 344, 344 (2013); Sue Ganske, Noneconomic Damages Caps
in Wrongful Death Medical Malpractice Cases - Are They Constitutional?, 14 FLA. ST. U. BUS.
REV. 31, 32–33 (2015).
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effects of these caps. As a result, this Note next focuses on the effect of the caps,
including doctors’ insurance premiums, patients’ insurance premiums, insurance
profits, physician retention, frivolous lawsuits, and difficulty finding
representation for those most vulnerable among us.
I. OVERVIEW OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGE CAPS
Noneconomic damages include a variety of compensation types and are
typically referred to as “pain and suffering” damages. “Serious injuries often
result in a plaintiff being unable to enjoy the activities he or she was previously
able to enjoy.” 7 This frequently leads to reduced social contact, which can affect
a plaintiff’s mental health. 8 Noneconomic damages are “subjective, nonmonetary, or intangible losses” intended to “make the plaintiff whole” after an
injury. 9 Noneconomic damages encapsulate these less-concrete losses.
Noneconomic damages include pain and suffering; mental and emotional
anguish; inconvenience; decreased quality of life; and loss of consortium,
society, companionship, love, and affection (which a spouse of an injured party
may claim). 10 These damages may also include humiliation and reputational
damage. 11 The lack of direct economic loss and lack of “hard numbers” for
noneconomic loss (unlike economic damages which have tangible numbers like
medical bills and lost wages, for example) makes it difficult for juries to assign
a monetary value to the pain and suffering awards. 12 Because of their subjective
and abstract nature, noneconomic damages have been the subject of tort reform
in many states. 13
The theory behind noneconomic damage caps was that introducing caps
would shrink the premiums physicians paid for liability insurance and reduce
the number of medical malpractice lawsuits. Some claim personal injury and
medical malpractice lawsuits have caused medical insurance premiums to
skyrocket within the law few decades. 14 To curb these insurance premiums, tort
reform proponents have introduced and pushed noneconomic damage caps. 15
These caps were also introduced to lower the number of medical malpractice
lawsuits, which has worked. Annual rates of paid medical malpractice claims
7. Non-Economic Damages, JUSTIA (Apr. 2018), https://www.justia.com/injury/negligencetheory/non-economic-damages/ [https://perma.cc/V5QR-V8R6].
8. Id.
9. Allyson Fish, Noneconomic Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice Litigation: Finding A
Solution That Satisfies All Affected Parties, 17 NEXUS: CHAPMAN J. L. & POL’Y 135, 136 (2012).
10. Id.
11. Non-Economic Damages, supra note 7.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Scott DeVito & Andrew Jurs, An Overreaction to A Nonexistent Problem: Empirical
Analysis of Tort Reform from the 1980s to 2000s, 3 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 62, 69 (2015).
15. Id. at 70–72.
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per 1000 physicians have decreased significantly. 16 From 1992 to 1996, the rate
of paid medical malpractice claims per 1000 physicians was 20.1. 17 From 1997
to 2002, this same measurement was 17.5. 18 This number again decreased from
2003 to 2008 and 2009 to 2014, with 13.2 and 8.9, respectively. 19
“[T]he structure of noneconomic damage caps can vary greatly among
states.” 20 There are three common forms of noneconomic damage caps. The first
is the hard cap, which sets the maximum amount of noneconomic damages a
plaintiff can be awarded. 21 Hard caps are adjusted yearly to account for
inflation. 22 The second is the flexible cap, which provides a tiered system of
noneconomic damages depending on factors like the severity of the injury
sustained. 23 The third is the staggered cap, which varies depending on the type
of defendant. 24 For example, South Carolina implements a provider/facility
stagger where noneconomic damages of a provider are set lower but the facility
can be liable for a larger amount. 25
The jury, as the finder of fact, is given discretion to determine how much a
plaintiff should be awarded depending on the circumstances of an individual
case. 26 Statutory noneconomic damage caps, however, require judges to reduce
those damages awarded by the jury to an injured plaintiff that exceed the ceiling
of the cap. 27 “As of January 2018, about half of the states have enacted some
variation of a cap on noneconomic damages while six states place a cap on total
damages.” 28 Several states have imposed caps which begin as low as $250,000. 29

16. Adam C. Schaffer et al., Rates and Characteristics of Paid Malpractice Claims Among US
Physicians by Specialty, 1992-2014, 177 JAMA INTERN. MED. 710, 710 (2017).
17. Id. at 712.
18. Id. at 714.
19. Id.
20. Zachary J. Cloutier, What Watts Forgot to Mention: Equal Protection Analysis of
Missouri’s Noneconomic Damage Cap, 83 UMKC L. REV. 403, 415 (2014).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Cloutier, supra note 20, at 415; S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-220(C) (2012).
26. Fish, supra note 9, at 137.
27. Id.
28. Medical Liability Reform Now! 5 AM. MED. ASSOC. 14 (2018), https://www.ama-assn.org
/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/premium/arc/mlr-now.pdf.
29. See W. McDonald Plosser, Sky’s the Limit? A 50-State Survey of Damages Caps and The
Collateral Source Rule, MONDAQ (Dec. 11, 2018), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/76257
4/Insurance/Skys+The+Limit+A+50State+Survey+Of+Damages+Caps+And+The+Collateral+
Source+Rule [https://perma.cc/AE2P-HDCL]; Medical Malpractice Damage Caps, MED.
MALPRACTICE CTR., http://malpracticecenter.com/legal/damage-caps (last visited Feb. 18, 2019);
Adam D. Glassman, The Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical Malpractice Liability Actions: Will
They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 417, 431 n.61, 435 (2004).
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Many have criticized the unfairness of these damage caps. 30 In one landmark
case, a healthy thirty-five-year-old mother of three was paralyzed and left
severely brain damaged by a negligent surgeon. 31 The jury returned a verdict of
$2,750,000 against defendants, but that verdict was reduced by $2,000,000 to
$750,000 in accordance with a Virginia damage cap statute. 32 In another case,
the estate of Kelly Smith brought an action against a hospital when it failed to
stabilize Smith’s condition (an open femur fracture) before transporting him. 33
Following trial, the jury awarded Plaintiff $5 million in noneconomic damages,
which was reduced by over $4.6 million to $359,000 in accordance with
Michigan’s damages cap. 34 Overall, noneconomic damage caps, on average,
reduce malpractice awards by $42,980, or about a fifteen percent reduction. 35
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY
The Supreme Court has not made a definitive ruling on the constitutionality
of damage caps, and state court decisions are across the board. 36 Noneconomic
damage caps have been struck down as unconstitutional in several states,
including Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. 37
In some states, including Illinois, Ohio, and Wisconsin, caps were struck down
by the states’ supreme courts and later reenacted in an amended form. 38
Customarily, noneconomic damage caps are challenged on six grounds: (1)
access to courts, (2) right to trial by jury, (3) due process, (4) separation of
powers, (5) privileges and immunities, and (6) equal rights and opportunities. 39
Most recently, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that Kansas’s statutory cap on
damages for noneconomic damages was unconstitutional on June 14, 2019. 40
30. See DeVito & Jurs, supra note 14, at 73.
31. Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525, 526–27 (Va. 1989).
32. Id. at 527.
33. Smith v. Botsford Gen. Hosp., 419 F.3d 513, 515 (6th Cir. 2005).
34. Id. at 515, 521.
35. Seth Seabury et al., Medical Malpractice Reform: Noneconomic Damages Caps Reduced
Payments 15 Percent, With Varied Effects By Specialty, HEALTHAFFAIRS (Oct. 22,
2014), available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4278571/ [https://perma.cc/G
C6F-UXCX].
36. Kevin J. Gfell, The Constitutional and Economic Implications of A National Cap on NonEconomic Damages in Medical Malpractice Actions, 37 IND. L. REV. 773, 781 (2004).
37. Medical Liability Reform Now!, supra note 28, at 25.
38. Ronen Avraham & Álvaro Bustos, The Unexpected Effects of Caps on Non-Economic
Damages, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 291, 291–92 (2010).
39. Miller & Weidhaas, supra note 6, at 345; Ganske, supra note 6, at 33, 45; Fish, supra note
9, at 142; J. Chase Bryan, Walter H. Boone & Jordan M. Mason, Are Non-Economic Caps
Constitutional?, 80 DEF. COUNSEL J. 154, 155 (2013).
40. Debra Cassens Weiss, Cap on Pain-and-Suffering Damages Violates Kansas Constitution,
State Supreme Court Says, ABA J. (June 18, 2019), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/caps-
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This long-controversial topic has largely been avoided by federal courts. “A
federal statutory cap on noneconomic damages in malpractice cases has never
been enacted because of political disagreement over what constitutes a proper
solution to the medical malpractice predicament.” 41
In 2011, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals weighed in on a
constitutional discussion of noneconomic damages, but ultimately certified four
of the constitutional arguments to the Supreme Court of Florida in Estate of
McCall v. United States. 42 The case involved a twenty-year-old woman who
bled to death following a cesarean section during the birth of her son at a U.S.
Air Force clinic in Florida. 43 The trial court awarded noneconomic damages of
$2 million, but the district court reduced the award to $1 million in accordance
with the statutory cap. 44 In 2014, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the
noneconomic damage cap violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Florida
Constitution. 45 Although McCall addressed only wrongful death actions, 46 the
Supreme Court of Florida expanded this same reasoning to all medical
negligence actions in 2017. 47
Recently, damages as a whole—economic, noneconomic, and punitive—
have come into the legal spotlight. Punitive damages are damages that are
considered a punishment or deterrent and are typically awarded at the court’s
discretion whenever a defendant’s behavior is especially reckless, wanton, or
malicious. 48 Punitive damages and noneconomic damages are closely related. In
fact, some state statutes include punitive damages within noneconomic
damages. 49 While the United States Supreme Court has largely stayed out of the
on-pain-and-suffering-damages-violate-kansas-constitution-state-supreme-court-says
[https://perma.cc/J7AT-8CWM].
41. Fish, supra note 9, at 138.
42. See Estate of McCall ex rel. McCall v. United States, 642 F.3d 944, 947 (11th Cir. 2011),
certified question answered sub nom. Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So.3d 894, 897 (Fla.
2014).
43. Pamela Sakowicz Menaker, Caps on Non-Economic Damages Held Unconstitutional,
AM. BAR ASSOC. (June 2, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/liti
gation-news/top-stories/2014/caps-on-non-economic-damages-held-unconstitutional/ [https://per
ma.cc/2ZGK-JYN8].
44. Id.
45. McCall, 134 So.3d at 897.
46. Bianca Bishop, Year in Review (Case Law) June 2015–June 2016, 20160627 AHLA
Seminar Papers 2 (June 27, 2016).
47. N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 174 So.3d 403, 413 (Fla.App. 2015), aff’d 219 So.3d
49, 58 (Fla. 2017) (noting that so long as the caps discriminate between classes of medical
malpractice victims, as they do in the personal injury context, they are rendered unconstitutional
by McCall, notwithstanding the legislature’s intentions).
48. Punitive Damages, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/punitive_damages (last visited Feb. 24, 2019).
49. Kristine C. Karnezis, Validity of State Statutory Cap on Punitive Damages, 103 A.L.R.5th
379 (2002).
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non-economic debate, the Court recently decided a case regarding punitive
damages. The Supreme Court denied punitive damages in unseaworthy claims,
which is especially noteworthy because it was the first punitive damages case in
which Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh participated
in as members of the Court. 50 However, because this case, at least on its face, is
limited to the context of federal maritime law and its connection with
seaworthiness claims, it is unclear what broader implications may follow. 51
Further, in 2018, in Lindenberg v. Jackson National Life Insurance, the
Sixth Circuit held that a Tennessee statutory cap on punitive damages was
unconstitutional because it violated the state’s right to trial by jury. 52 This
decision sparked an examination of whether appellate court panels should be
deciding issues of first impression. 53 In this case, U.S. Circuit Judge Eric Clay
acknowledged the “lack of uniformity” among states regarding punitive damage
caps. 54 The majority held that “[s]uch an infringing reduction is not analogous
to permissible legal consequences that impact a jury’s verdict.” 55 As a result, the
Sixth Circuit determined that punitive damages caps are unconstitutional. 56
However, this case also included a twenty-one page dissent by Judge Joan
Larsen stating that this matter should have been decided by the Tennessee
Supreme Court. 57 The Sixth Circuit is unlikely to have the last word on this
issue. 58 The Tennessee Court of Appeals and ultimately the Tennessee Supreme
Court eventually will step in. 59 Until then, however, cases in federal court will
now be governed by the two-judge decision in Lindenberg. 60 As tort reformists

50. Evan M. Tager, Supreme Court Holds That Punitive Damages May Not Be Awarded in
Connection With Unseaworthiness Claims, GUIDEPOSTS (June 26, 2019), https://www.punitive
damagesblog.com/2019/06/supreme-court-holds-that-punitive-damages-may-not-be-awarded-inconnection-with-unseaworthiness-claims/ [https://perma.cc/2YGF-6G92].
51. Id.
52. Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 912 F.3d 348, 367 (6th Cir. 2018).
53. Miriam R. Nemetz & Evan M. Tager, Sixth Circuit Invalidates Tennessee’s PunitiveDamages Cap And Holds That Punitive Damages are Available Under Tennessee Law For BadFaith Denial of Insurance Benefits, MONDAQ (Jan. 30, 2019), http://www.mondaq.com/united
states/x/776336/Insurance/Sixth+Circuit+Invalidates+Tennessees+PunitiveDamages+Cap+and+
Holds+That+Punitive+Damages+Are+Available+Under+Tennessee+Law+For+BadFaith+Denial
+Of+Insurance+Benefits?type=popular [https://perma.cc/J823-NDRU] (this appellate court panel
consisted of three judges).
54. Lindenberg, 912 F.3d at 366–67.
55. Id. at 369.
56. Id. at 369–70.
57. Id. at 370.
58. Nemetz & Tager, supra note 53.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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commonly try to limit both punitive and noneconomic damages, 61 these cases
regarding punitive damages may also affect cases about noneconomic damages.
Moreover, recent court decisions are bringing the discussion of effectiveness
of noneconomic damage caps into their opinions when deciding cases. For
example, in Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Medical Center, Judge Richard Teitelman of
the Missouri Supreme Court wrote a separate concurring opinion to emphasize
the effects of caps on noneconomic damages. 62 In this case, the trial court
reduced James Klotz’s award of noneconomic damages against the defendant
hospital and physician from $509,200 to $234,500. 63 Judge Teitelman’s
concurrence highlights that noneconomic damage caps present disproportionate
disadvantages to the most seriously injured people, young people, and
economically disadvantaged people. 64 He reasoned that these types of plaintiffs
are disproportionately impacted by the “arbitrary limits on noneconomic
damages.” 65 Judge Teitelman emphasized that denying full compensation to the
young and economically disadvantaged effectively extinguishes their claims. 66
Additionally, he acknowledged that, due to the money it takes to prove medical
negligence, few lawyers, who often must work on a contingency fee basis, will
take a medical negligence case on behalf of a poor person whose damages are
disproportionately noneconomic. 67 This concurrence concludes that caps on
noneconomic damages act as “a padlock on the courthouse door.” 68
Additionally, in McCall’s plurality, the Supreme Court of Florida observed
that other states’ supreme courts have also struck down noneconomic damage
caps. 69 According to the plurality, the Florida caps on noneconomic damages in
wrongful death medical malpractice cases save “a modest amount for many by
imposing devastating costs on a few—those who are most grievously injured,
those who sustain the greatest damage and loss, and multiple claimants for
whom judicially determined noneconomic damages are subject to division and
reduction simply based upon the existence of the cap.” 70 This language was also
quoted by the Florida Supreme Court in 2017 in North Broward Hospital
61. Effect of Tort Reform on Personal Injury Cases, ALL LAW, https://www.alllaw.com/arti
cles/nolo/personal-injury/effect-tort-reform.html [https://perma.cc/Y56E-CD74] (last visited Sept.
14, 2019).
62. Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 311 S.W.3d 752, 782 (Mo. 2010), as modified (May 25,
2010).
63. Id. at 759.
64. See id. at 782 (noting that economically disadvantaged people include poverty-stricken,
the physically and mentally disabled, single mothers, wounded veterans, the elderly, and others).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Klotz, 311 S.W.3d at 782.
68. Id.
69. Ganske, supra note 6, at 46 (citing Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So.3d 894, 916
(Fla. 2014)).
70. Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So.3d 894, 903 (Fla. 2014) (emphasis added).
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District v. Kalitan. 71 In Kalitan, the court held that statutory caps on personal
injury noneconomic damages in medical negligence actions violated the Florida
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. 72
Further, in 2017, the majority in Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured Patients
discussed that the state’s noneconomic damage cap had little to no effect on
physician retention in Wisconsin. 73 The Mayo court also stated the noneconomic
damage caps have “the practical effect of imposing devastating costs on the few
who sustain the greatest damages and creates a class of catastrophically injured
victims who are denied the adequate compensation awarded by a jury, while the
less severely injured malpractice victims are awarded their full compensation.” 74
As a result, the court found the $750,000 noneconomic damage cap to be
arbitrary and unsupported by the statutory goals. 75
This focus on the effects on noneconomic damage caps in recent court
decisions involves the larger debate that will likely be the center of upcoming
decisions regarding noneconomic damage caps. This author, like the Mayo
majority, suggests that noneconomic damage caps present more disadvantages
than benefits and do not achieve the goals they were set forth to accomplish.
III. EFFECTS OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGE CAPS
A.

Effect on Physician Insurance Premiums

As mentioned above, one purpose of damage caps is to reduce medical
malpractice insurance premiums for physicians. 76 When noneconomic caps
began, many physicians faced exorbitant medical malpractice liability insurance
premium increases, as much as 100 percent or 200 percent more than previous
years. 77 Some physicians were dropped by their insurers and forced to select
other insurers, practice without coverage, move to other states with lower
medical malpractice insurance premiums, or give up medicine altogether. 78 The
hope was that noneconomic damage caps would alleviate some of the financial
burden on physicians.

71. N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 219 So.3d 49, 57 (Fla. 2017).
72. Id. at 50.
73. Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 901 N.W.2d 782, 791 (Wis. App.
2017). This decision was reversed in a 2018 holding that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages
was not facially unconstitutional. Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 914
N.W.2d 678, 684 (Wis. 2018).
74. Mayo, 901 N.W.2d at 794.
75. Id.
76. Adam D. Glassman, The Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical Malpractice Liability
Actions: Will They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 417, 419 (2004).
77. Id. at 417.
78. Id.
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However, noneconomic damage caps did not turn out to be the savior for the
malpractice insurance crisis that many hoped they would be. The effects of the
caps on physician insurance premiums are modest. 79 In fact, data from the
Americans for Insurance Reform concludes that limiting patients’ legal rights
through damage caps do not result in lower premiums for the doctors and could
suggest the opposite. 80 A 2016 study found that, “[s]tates that enacted new limits
on patients’ legal rights in medical malpractice cases (caps on damages plus
other traditional tort reforms) saw an average 22.7 percent decrease in pure
premiums from 2002 to the present—but states that did nothing saw a larger
average drop of 29.5 percent.” 81 Even more striking, when discussing only
noneconomic damage caps and excluding other traditional tort reforms, states
that enacted only caps on damages saw an average 21.8 percent decrease in pure
premiums from 2002 to 2016. 82 However, the states that did nothing saw an even
greater average drop of 28.9 percent. 83
This trend is supported by data from several states. For example, Missouri,
a “crisis state” identified by the American Medical Association, had a cap on
noneconomic damages since 1986. 84 In 2003, the Missouri Department of
Insurance saw a drop of 14 percent in new medical malpractice insurance claims
(a record low) and total payouts to medical malpractice lawsuits dropped 21
percent from the previous year. 85 This resulted in an approximate 30 percent
reduction of total payouts since 1991. 86 Paid claims against physicians fells 42.3
percent during the same time period. 87 Yet between 2000 and 2003, during a
time where everything seemed to be going right for doctors’ insurance rates, the
premiums rose by an astounding 121 percent. 88
79. Michelle M. Mello, Medical Malpractice: Impact of the Crisis and Effect of State Tort
Reforms, THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. 1 (May 2006), available at https://folio.iu
pui.edu/bitstream/handle/10244/526/no10_researchreport.pdf.
80. J. Robert Hunter & Joanna Doroshow, Premium Deceit 2016: The Failure of “Tort
Reform” to Cut Insurance Prices, AMERICANS FOR INS. REFORM 6 (Nov. 2016), http://cen
terjd.org/system/files/MasterPremiumDeceit2016F3.pdf.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. “Caps” Do Not Lower Insurance Premiums For Doctors (and Insurance Insiders Admit
It), CTR. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY (Apr. 12, 2011), https://www.centerjd.org/sites/default/files/
ckfinder/userfiles/files/CapsDontWorkF(1).pdf. This cap was struck down as unconstitutional in
July 2012—twenty-six years after its enactment. Missouri’s non-economic damage cap is now
$400,000. See Caps on Damages, AM. MED. ASSOC., https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.
org/files/corp/media-browser/premium/arc/caps-on-damages_0.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.; Mo. Malpractice Claims Fall But Premiums Rise, INS. J. (Nov. 9, 2004),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/midwest/2004/11/09/47543.htm [https://perma.cc/N6YEK5TX].
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Even with new cap legislation, insurers are free to raise their prices—and
they have. In Florida, political leaders vowed that a sweeping medical
malpractice overhaul bill would “reduce ever-increasing insurance premiums for
Florida’s physicians,” but insurers soon followed up with requests to increase
premiums by as much as 45 percent. 89 In Mississippi, four months after medical
malpractice caps were passed, surgeons still could not find affordable insurance
and many Mississippi doctors were still limiting their practices or walking off
the job in protest. 90 In Nevada, within weeks of enacting medical malpractice
caps, insurance companies asserted they would not reduce insurance rates for
another year or two, if ever. 91 Then, three medical malpractice insurers in
Nevada filed for sixteen, twenty-five, and ninety-three percent rate increases. 92
In Ohio, almost immediately after medical malpractice tort reform was passed,
each major medical malpractice insurance company within the state announced
they would not reduce their rates, with one company predicting the company
would seek a 20 percent rate increase. 93 In Oklahoma, after medical malpractice
caps passed in 2003, a large insurer instituted a 20 percent raise in its premiums,
followed by an extreme 105 percent rate hike in 2004. 94 Further, just after tort
reform passed, the state’s largest insurance company, owned by the state medical
association, requested an astonishing 83 percent rate hike, which was approved
with the condition it be phased in over three years. 95 In Texas, tort reformists
promised rate cuts if tort reform was passed, but after the referendum passed,
major insurers requested rate hikes as high as 35 percent for doctors and 65
percent for hospitals. 96 When one insurance company was denied a rate increase,
it announced it was using a legal loophole to avoid regulation and increase
premiums without approval. 97 “In a 2004 filing to the Texas Department of

89. Julie Kay, Surprise Hikes; Despite Legislation that Promised to Rein in Physicians’
Insurance Premiums, Three Firms File for Big Rate Increases, 50 PALM BEACH DAILY BUS. REV.
7, 7 (2003).
90. “Caps” Do Not Lower Insurance Premiums For Doctors (and Insurance Insiders Admit
It), supra note 84; see also Limiting Liability Will Not Fix Insurance Problems, AMERICANS FOR
INS. REFORM (Apr. 2004), https://www.insurance-reform.org/studies/AIRCaps-then-RateHikes.pdf (citing Miss. Tort Reform Effort Falls Short, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Feb. 18, 2003);
Reed Branson, Doctors In Oxford Shut, Cite Insurance, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Feb. 14, 2003);
Ben Bryant, Tort Reform Has Done Little to Ease Malpractice Crisis, BILOXI SUN-HERALD (Feb.
2, 2003)).
91. “Caps” Do Not Lower Insurance Premiums For Doctors (and Insurance Insiders Admit
It), supra note 84.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. “Caps” Do Not Lower Insurance Premiums For Doctors (and Insurance Insiders Admit
It), supra note 84.
97. Id.
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Insurance, GE Medical Protective revealed that the state’s noneconomic damage
cap would be responsible for no more than a 1 percent drop in losses.” 98 In
effect, insurance companies are profiting more, despite medical malpractice
premium decreases. 99
The effects of these caps are modest because malpractice premiums can be
a “convenient scapegoat for frustrated physicians.” 100 While a physician may
suspect malpractice premiums to be the culprit when their income does not grow,
fails to keep up with inflation, or declines altogether, the problem lies
elsewhere. 101 Some pay cuts derive from health insurers clamping down on
physician fees and denying payment for services that they deem unnecessary. 102
Some pay cuts are the result of changes in federal medical legislation. 103 There
are many factors that contribute to physician health insurance rates, yet many
point the finger at injured patients and the families of deceased patients seeking
damages for their losses.
B.

Effect on Public Insurance Premiums

There is also underwhelming evidence that noneconomic damage caps
reduce insurance premiums or even significantly affect insurance premiums for
patients. A core policy argument used to support adoption of damage caps is that
caps will reduce defensive medicine and, thus, reduce healthcare spending, 104
but this has not been the case. From 2003 to 2015, “the value of medical lawsuit
malpractice payments declined by 22 percent.” 105 “Meanwhile, national
healthcare costs rose by over 80 percent.” 106
One independent study concluded that damage caps and increases in
insurance rates are not related because “less than .6% of claims brought are for
over $100,000.” 107 Approximately $215 billion was collected in 2003 for

98. Id.
99. Miller & Weidhaas, supra note 6, at 350.
100. Marc A. Rodwin et al., Why the Medical Malpractice Crisis Persists Even When
Malpractice Insurance Premiums Fall, 25 HEALTH MATRIX: J. OF L.-MED. 163, 223 (2015).
101. Id. at 191–92.
102. Id. at 193.
103. Scott Gottlieb, Doctors Will Have To Take A Pay Cut Under Obamacare, FORBES (June
28, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottgottlieb/2013/06/28/doctors-will-have-to-take-a-pay
-cut-under-obamacare/#1054cc693a78 [https://perma.cc/SR7K-GGQ8].
104. Ali Moghtaderi et al., Damage Caps and Defensive Medicine: Reexamination with
Patient-Level Data, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 26, 26 (2019); see also Myungho Paik et al.,
Damage Caps and Defensive Medicine, Revisited, 51 J. HEALTH ECON. 84, 84 (2017).
105. Taylor Lincoln, The Medical Malpractice Scapegoat, PUBLIC CITIZEN 7 (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/medical-malpractice-scapegoat-report.pdf.
106. Id.
107. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Tex. 1988) (citing The Keeton Report at 7;
Sumner, The Dollars and Sense of Malpractice Insurance, 9 (Aft Books 1979)).
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insurance premiums. 108 Of this $215 billion, only $11 billion was attributable to
medical negligence premiums. 109 During the same year, “more than $1.5 trillion
was spent on healthcare.” 110 Costs constituting “less than 1% of healthcare costs
could hardly have the impact that proponents of the medical malpractice myth
claim.” 111 A national study supported similar findings stating, “[c]ap supporters
attribute medical malpractice claims to rising healthcare costs, but a national
study showed that the direct cost of malpractice accounts for less than two
percent of total national healthcare costs.” 112 Another study concluded that in
2015 (the most recent year where data was available), “medical malpractice
payments on behalf of doctors amounted to about 0.2 percent of costs for
hospital and physician services and about 0.1 percent of all healthcare costs.”113
In over thirty years, medical malpractice premiums and claims have never been
greater than one percent of our nation’s healthcare costs. 114
Thus, even a significant “reduction of 25 to 30 percent in malpractice costs
would lower health care costs by only about [0].4 to 0.5 percent, and the likely
effect on health insurance premiums would be comparably small.” 115 The
Congressional Budget Office found that even if the country enacted an entire
menu of extreme tort restrictions it could only yield an extremely small
percentage of health care savings, about 0.5%. 116 “The small number and size of
most awards is at odds with the argument that large medical malpractice damage
verdicts are a major reason for the rise in healthcare costs or premiums.” 117
There is, at the least, no evidence that caps reduce healthcare spending. 118
C. The Real Winners of Noneconomic Damages
The reduction in payouts has, instead, created record surpluses for insurance
companies over the past few years, despite their claims of a litigation “crisis”

108. Kenneth C. Chessick & Matthew D. Robinson, Medical Negligence Litigation is Not the
Problem, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 563, 570 (2006).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Miller & Weidhaas, supra note 6, at 350.
113. Lincoln, supra note 105, at 5.
114. J. Robert Hunter et al., True Risk: Medical Liability, Malpractice Insurance And Health
Care, AMERICANS FOR INS. REFORM 2 (July 22, 2009), www.insurance-reform.org/studies/True
RiskF.pdf.
115. Miller & Weidhaas, supra note 6, at 350.
116. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director of the Congressional Budget Office, to Orrin
G. Hatch, United States Senator (Oct. 9, 2009) (available at http://www.cbo.gov/publication/413
34).
117. Miller & Weidhaas, supra note 6, at 348.
118. Moghtaderi et al., supra note 104, at 28–29.
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causing higher premiums. 119 The Americans for Insurance Reform (AIR) found
that no matter how profits were measured, medical malpractice insurers were
incredibly profitable, especially when compared to other sectors in the
economy. 120 In 2016, the medical professional liability insurance industry
continued an unprecedented run of thirteen consecutive profitable years. 121 In
May of 2018, the U.S. medical professional liability insurance sector’s net
income rose fifty percent, despite a second-straight year of underwriting
losses. 122 In fact, the average profit of the top ten medical malpractice insurance
companies in 2008 was higher than ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500
companies and thirty-five times higher than the Fortune 500 average for the
same time period. 123 Moreover, “insurance company profits are 24 percent
higher in states with caps.” 124 “[I]n states with caps, insurance companies took
in 3.5 times what they paid out.” 125 As a striking example, “California saw
insurance rates increase over 450 percent in the 13 years after it passed MICRA,
a severe cap on damages, and only saw rates go down in the wake of Proposition
103, a set of insurance reforms that included mandatory rollbacks.” 126
While noneconomic damage caps on medical malpractice claims have
become a major push for tort reform, they do not significantly lower insurance
rates. 127 Many insurance industry insiders acknowledge this and undermine any
argument for noneconomic damage caps reducing premiums. For example,
Victor Schwartz, General Counsel of the American Tort Reform Association
stated, “[M]any tort reform advocates do not contend that restricting litigation
will lower insurance rates, and I’ve never said that in 30 years.” 128 Additionally,
Robert Nagel, an Assistant Vice President of State Farm Insurance Company
119. Insurance Company Handout: How the Industry Used Tort Reform to Increase Profits
While Americans’ Premiums Soared, AMERICAN ASS’N FOR JUST. ON MED. NEGLIGENCE 3–5
(Dec. 2009), https://www.decof.com/documents/the-truth-about-medical-malpractice-insurers.pdf.
120. See generally Hunter et al., supra note 114.
121. Eric J. Wunder & Brad J. Parker, 2016 Year-End Financial Results for Medical
Professional Liability Specialty Writers, 42 MED. LIAB. MONITOR 5, 5 (2017).
122. Best’s Special Report: Myriad Challenges Test the Mettle of Medical Professional
Liability Writers, A.M. BEST (May 10, 2018), http://news.ambest.com/PressContent.aspx?altsrc=
14&refnum=26578 [https://perma.cc/NUT6-AQAP] (discussing A.M. Best’s report and noting that
“[d]espite a second-straight year of underwriting losses, the U.S. medical professional liability
insurance sector’s net income rose 50% year over year as realized capital gains increased threefold
. . . .”).
123. Insurance Company Handout: How the Industry Used Tort Reform to Increase Profits
While Americans’ Premiums Soared, supra note 119, at 3.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 6.
126. Id. at 7.
127. Press Release, Americans for Insurance Reform, Industry Insiders Admit – And History
Shows: Tort Reform Will Not Lower Insurance Rates (June 2, 2003) (available at https://www.in
surance-reform.org/pr/Quotes.pdf).
128. Id.
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(Kansas) stated, “[W]e believe the effect of tort reform on our book of business
would be small . . . [T]he loss savings resulting from the non-economic cap will
not exceed 1% of our total indemnity losses . . . .” 129 Moreover, after Florida
enacted “full-fledged tort reform,” including a noneconomic damage cap, Aetna
Casualty and Insurance Co. (Florida) concluded the reforms would not affect
Aetna’s rates. 130 Yet noneconomic damages are still largely blamed for the
soaring prices of insurance.
In sum, when insurance companies pay out less, they keep more. 131 Any
“crisis” that exists is more likely the result of the cyclical nature of the
economy. 132 While patients see climbing insurance premiums, insurance
companies are remaining extraordinarily profitable and are raking in any
benefits of medical malpractice noneconomic caps.
D. Fleeing Physicians
“Physician labor supply has long-standing importance for access to and
quality of healthcare delivered in the United States.” 133 However, America is
facing a possible physician shortage, with a predicted absence of up to 120,000
physicians by 2030. 134 A common argument in tort reform identifies one
potential driver of physician shortages as physicians who may not want to
practice in states that have unfavorable malpractice laws because they may be
forced to pay higher malpractice premiums or may feel they are at higher risk
for being sued. 135 However, research does not reflect this trend, but rather,
suggests the opposite.
Noneconomic damage caps have little effect on the number of physicians
practicing within a state. “Fears that doctors flee states lacking caps on medical
malpractice noneconomic damages are unfounded.” 136 The pre- and postHyman Study reported in the Social Science Research Network concluded that
although the raw number of physicians increased after caps were imposed, the
129. Id. (citing Letter from Robert J. Nagel, Assistant Vice President, State Filings Division, to
Ray Rather, Kansas Insurance Department, October 21, 1986, at 1–2).
130. Id. (Citing Bodily Injury Claim Cost Impact of Florida Tort Law Change, AETNA
CASUALTY & SUR. CO., COMMERCIAL INS. DIV. (1986)).
131. Id.
132. Kelly Kotur, An Extreme Response or A Necessary Reform? Revealing How Caps on
Noneconomic Damages Actually Affect Medical Malpractice Victims and Malpractice Insurance
Rates, 108 W. Va. L. Rev. 873, 889 (2006).
133. Michael F. Pesko et. al., The Effects of Malpractice Non-Economic Damage Caps on the
Supply of Physician Labor: Heterogeneity by Physician Age and Risk, INT. REV. L. ECON. (2017),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5675024 [https://perma.cc/29W7-U3EX].
134. New Research Shows Increasing Physician Shortages in Both Primary and Specialty Care,
AAMC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2018), https://news.aamc.org/press-releases/article/workforce_report_
shortage_04112018/ [https://perma.cc/KX6E-VSCT].
135. Pesko et al., supra note 133.
136. Miller & Weidhaas, supra note 6, at 349.
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rate of increase in Texas of active, direct patient care physicians per capita was
actually lower after caps were implemented. 137 Likewise, the Mayo court
concluded that Wisconsin’s damage cap did not help retain physicians. 138 In a
study of nineteen states, researchers found that even though one “might expect
to see shifts in physician supply in the 2003–2006 period during which
malpractice caps were being enacted, or shortly after, . . . we do not see any
obvious visual evidence of this.” 139
The increasing physician shortage’s main cause lies within a growing, aging
population and physician retirement, rather than with medical malpractice
caps. 140 “The combination of an aging patient population and an aging physician
population is creating one of the underlying drivers of the growing physician
shortage.” 141 In a study of twenty-three major specialties, thirteen are comprised
of forty-five percent or more physicians that are fifty-five years of age and
older. 142 Twenty-two percent of physicians aged fifty-six or older indicated they
would retire in the next one to three years, while over nine percent of all
physicians indicated they would retire in the next one to three years. 143
Moreover, doctors turning to retirement or leaving the field altogether
typically do so for factors other than noneconomic damage caps. “Doctors are
considering retirement as they feel the pressure of declining reimbursement,
increased administrative burden, and industry consolidation.” 144 In a survey
studying physician work trends, poor work/life balance, stress, and inadequate
compensation were top factors that would cause young physicians to consider
searching for a new position. 145 A 2016 study by the University at Albany
School of Public Health concluded that only seven percent of respondents cited
the cost of malpractice insurance as a reason for practicing outside of New York

137. Id.
138. Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients and Families Comp. Fund, 901 N.W.2d 782, 791 (Wis. App.
2017).
139. Pesko et al., supra note 133 (note that this study does find evidence that the supply of highrisk physician specialists under thirty-five years of age rose due to noneconomic damage caps).
140. Changes in physician-retirement decisions could have the greatest impact on supply, and
over one-third of all currently active physicians will be 65 or older within the next decade. New
Research Shows Increasing Physician Shortages in Both Primary and Specialty Care, supra note
134.
141. The Aging Physician Workforce: A Demographic Dilemma, MERRITT HAWKINS (2015),
https://www.hasc.org/sites/main/files/link1mhawhitepaperaging.pdf.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. The Future of Healthcare: A National Survey of Physicians, THE DOCTORS CO. (Sept.
2018), https://www.thedoctors.com/contentassets/23c0cee958364c6582d4ba95afa47fcc/11724b_
fohc-survey_0918_nomarks_spread_fr-1.pdf.
145. Survey: Young Doctors Still Finding Jobs The Old-Fashioned Way, COMPHEALTH (Mar.
2018), https://comphealth.com/resources/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/CPHY68352_EarlyCareer
PhysReport_rw_v6_f.pdf.
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State. 146 Further, as in previous years, New York’s liability laws or legal
environment were not even listed. 147 As a result, “there is ‘no demonstrably
consistent’ proof that doctors are likelier to continue practicing in states with
damages caps.” 148 In fact, data suggests some states with no noneconomic
damage caps actually have higher retention rates. 149
E.

Trickle Rather than Floodgate

Some advocates for noneconomic damage caps claim that tort reform keeps
out frivolous lawsuits. 150 However, frivolous lawsuits seem to be another
medical malpractice scapegoat. Harvard researchers concluded that “portraits of
a malpractice system that [are] stricken with frivolous litigation are
overblown.” 151 This is a common perception by other academics, including
eighty-five percent of judges, who do not believe frivolous suits are a serious
problem. 152
“[T]here are far more cases of medical malpractice than medical malpractice
litigation.” 153 The Department of Insurance, Financial Institutions, and
Professional Registration (DFIP) asserts that only a small percent of people
harmed by medical malpractice make claims. 154 In the United States, there are
about ten incidents of medical malpractice for every one malpractice claim. 155
One “Harvard team looked at about 30,000 hospital records in New York and
found conclusive evidence of a serious injury from medical malpractice in the
records of 280 patients.” 156 However, only eight of the 280 patients brought a
claim. 157 “That is less than three percent.” 158 Similar findings occurred in Utah
146. 2016 New York Residency Training Outcomes: A Summary of Responses to the 2016 New
York Resident Exit Survey, CENTER FOR HEALTH WORKFORCE STUDIES, SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH,
S.U.N.Y. ALBANY (Sept. 2017), https://www.chwsny.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/2016-NYExit-Survey-Report.pdf.
147. Id.
148. Alison Frankel, Damages Caps in Medical Cases Do Not Lower Costs, Improve Care:
Wisconsin Appeals Court, REUTERS (July 6, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-med
mal-idUSKBN19R2NK [https://perma.cc/6VAN-TM7F] (quoting Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured
Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 914 N.W.2d 678, 706).
149. Id.
150. Christine Hines, No “Frivolous Lawsuits” Here, THE HILL (Feb. 11, 2011), https://thehill.
com/blogs/congress-blog/civil-rights/141401-no-frivolous-lawsuits-here [https://perma.cc/CF9W3739].
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 69 (2005).
154. Miller & Weidhaas, supra note 6, at 348.
155. BAKER, supra note 153, at 69 (“Because hospital record reviews miss so much medical
malpractice, the real multiple is much higher.”).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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and Colorado, where 15,000 hospital records indicated conclusive evidence of a
serious injury from medical malpractice in the records of 161 patients. 159 Only
four of the 161 brought claims, which is also less than three percent. 160
Frivolous lawsuits are unlikely because bringing a meritless claim is
expensive. 161 Plaintiff’s lawyers typically work on contingency fees and
advance expenses on their cases. 162 Contingency fees allow many, who would
otherwise be unable to pay an attorney, to see their day in court. “Expert
witnesses can charge hundreds or even thousands of dollars per hour to review
documents and testify during depositions and trials.” 163 “It is not uncommon for
an expert witness to spend a total of 20–30 hours on a case, between preparation
time, travel, and in-court time.” 164 Plaintiff’s attorneys using contingency fee
arrangements bear this cost but take it out of a settlement if one is received. 165
As a result, plaintiff’s attorneys have little incentive to take on weak cases. 166
“Studies show that plaintiffs’ lawyers concentrating in medical malpractice
routinely reject 80 percent or more of the requests for representation they
receive.” 167
Another safeguard against frivolous lawsuits are affidavit of merit
requirements. 168 An affidavit of merit must be filed with the court following a
petition and must include a written opinion of a qualified health provider
maintaining that the standard of care was breached. 169 In the United States,
twenty-nine states have statutes that require an affidavit of merit in a medical
malpractice claim. 170
159. Id.
160. BAKER, supra note 153, at 69.
161. Miller & Weidhaas, supra note 6, at 349.
162. Id.
163. Andrew Suszek, How Much Will it Cost to Bring a Medical Malpractice Claim, ALL LAW,
https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/personal-injury/cost-bring-claim.html [https://perma.cc/SZ
B3-3YEP] (last visited Sept. 23, 2019).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Miller & Weidhaas, supra note 6, at 349.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2603 (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602 (2019); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 52-190a (2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6853; FLA. STAT. § 766.104 (2019); GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-12.5 (2019); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2622 (2019); MD. CODE ANN. CTS & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04 (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
600.2912d (2020); MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-58 (2019); MO. REV.
STAT. § 538.225 (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.071 (2019); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:53A-27 (2019);
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. & RULES LAW § 3012-a; N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (2019); OHIO R. CIV. P.
10; OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 19.1 (2019); PA. R. CIV. P. 1042.3 (2019); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-36-100
(2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-122 (2019); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351
(2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-423 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1042 (2019); VA. CODE
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Difficulty Finding Representation

While medical malpractice noneconomic damage caps do not affect
frivolous lawsuits, they do affect those with rightful claims. Damage caps make
it more difficult for attorneys to afford to take on legitimate cases, keeping in
mind the cost of litigation. 171 Damage caps and other tort reforms that artificially
reduce plaintiffs’ damage awards also reduce contingent fee attorneys’ expected
recoveries, resulting in fewer economically viable cases to accept. 172 “Because
of the complexity and expense of medical malpractice lawsuits, employing a
lawyer is critical to a successful claim.” 173 The high costs of medical malpractice
investigation and litigation leave many malpractice victims without legal
remedy. 174 As a result, “many legitimate victims of medical malpractice have no
meaningful access to the civil justice system.” 175 Ninety-five percent of medical
malpractice victims report having extreme difficulty finding legal
representation, unless their damages are significantly larger than the typical
damages for their types of injuries. 176 This problem is worsening, as the
economic realities continue to silence a growing number of victims. 177
This problem is highlighted in a recent investigative podcast, Dr. Death. Dr.
Death investigates Dr. Christopher Duntsch, whose medical errors resulted in
multiple deaths and catastrophic injuries to patients. 178 Duntsch attended a
reputable medical school, had glowing online reviews, and received no negative
attention from the Texas Medical board. 179 However his career quickly went
south. He was likely one of the first, if not the first, doctor to be convicted of
knowingly or intentionally injuring a patient. 180 While this podcast is primarily
ANN. § 8.01-20.1 (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.150 (2020); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6 (2019);
WYO. STAT. § 9-2-151 (2019).
171. Miller & Weidhaas, supra note 6, at 349.
172. Joanna Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American Medical Liability System,
67 VANDERBILT L. REV. 151, 194 (2014).
173. Id. at 173.
174. Id. at 167.
175. Id. at 154.
176. Id. at 193.
177. Shepherd, supra note 172, at 154.
178. Dr. Death: Free Fall, WONDERY (Sept. 18, 2018) (downloaded using iTunes).
179. Id.
180. Id. (In the podcast, the prosecution team stated, “It’s extremely unusual, we did a lot of
research to see if we could find anyone else who’d done cases like this – any other doctors who had
been prosecuted for what they had actually done within the surgery . . . we couldn’t find anyone.”
Toby Shook, a Dallas defense attorney who spent twenty-three years working as a Dallas County
prosecutor stated, “I cannot recall a physician being indicted for aggravated assault for acts
committed during surgery . . . and not just Dallas County—I don’t recall hearing about it
anywhere.” Kevin Brooks, a Dallas County prosecutor stated, “You don’t see a doctor charged with
this.” Brooks also noted that doctors who run afoul of the law usually are accused of insurance or
prescription fraud. With regard to doctors being prosecuted for errors committed during surgery,
Brooks concluded, “It’s fairly rare.”)
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about a doctor’s extreme misconduct and the holes within medical malpractice
reporting, it ends highlighting how medical malpractice caps in Texas left many
severely injured patients without a remedy. 181
Barry Morguloff, one of Duntsch’s victims, recalls, “I could not find an
attorney to save my life that would take the case. Come to find out, [in] the state
of Texas, there are caps on malpractice and it is not worth an attorney’s time and
energy to take on a malpractice case . . . .” 182 Many of Duntsch’s victims
experienced this difficulty. 183 Attorney Mike Lions states how noneconomic
damage caps can prohibit recovery,
What I see day to day is people calling me saying “they killed my child—they
killed my child in the ER” and now, what do we do? Well, what you do is you
pray that you get pregnant again and have another baby because no lawyer is
going to take that case. That child didn’t have a job, has no economic loss, your
physical pain and suffering is capped at $250,000. 184

Moreover, those left without a legal remedy or little economic recovery are
also the most vulnerable among us. Damage caps can disproportionately burden
the most severely injured patients. 185 The largest impacts in dollar terms from
noneconomic damage cases were in pediatrics and obstetrics/gynecology, where
average payments were reduced by over $100,000. 186 Along with pregnant
women and babies, noneconomic damage caps have disparate effect on elderly
residents in nursing homes due to the general lack of meaningful economic
damages among typical nursing home claimants. 187 The elderly are especially
vulnerable because many are not earning money and have very little to no
potential to earn money in the future. Those with the least earning power are the
most vulnerable. 188 Even worse, these caps only affect the victims of malpractice
who have suffered the most (or have the most damage-worthy injuries) because
only those most seriously injured will have noneconomic damages that reach the
limits of the caps. 189

181. Dr. Death: Closure, WONDERY (Sept. 25, 2018).
182. Id. at 5:10.
183. Id. at 5:05.
184. Id. at 10:30.
185. Mello, supra note 79.
186. Medical Liability Reform Now!, supra note 28, at 12.
187. See generally Michael L. Rustad, Neglecting the Neglected: The Impact of Noneconomic
Damage Caps on Meritorious Nursing Home Lawsuits, 14 ELDER L.J. 331 (2006).
188. Dr. Death: Closure, supra note 181, at 9:50.
189. Billy Corriher, The Other Terrible Health Care Bill Pending In Congress, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (July 20, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/reports/2017/07/20/4
36343/terrible-health-care-bill-pending-congress/ [https://perma.cc/74SE-A4TR].
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CONCLUSION
The sharp divergence amongst the states of whether to have noneconomic
damage caps has been present for decades. As seen, many states have upheld
noneconomic damage caps while others have struck them down. Some never
enacted the caps at all. Still, the federal courts and government have largely
stayed out of the division. 190 In effect, “pain and suffering” damage caps have
little effect on healthcare costs but a major effect on legal rights of an injured
patient. There is no proof that noneconomic damage caps actually make doctors’
insurance premiums lower or that they are a primary factor in many of the
hurdles facing physicians today. Additionally, noneconomic damages do not
significantly impact insurance rates for patients either.
However, noneconomic damages do harshly influence those who are hurt
the most by negligent doctors or medical staff. They also allow insurance
companies to profit at patients’ expense. Noneconomic damage caps are not the
answer to fixing health insurance premiums, but they are used as a scapegoat to
avoid the true problems to the detriment of the most vulnerable Americans. The
caps also bring up larger national issues: Should it matter which state the loss
occurred in? Within a state, should it matter how many legally protected family
members are left after a devastating loss? 191
However, there is still possibility for change. Plaintiffs’ bar members view
recent decisions superseding noneconomic damage caps as long overdue and as
indicative of a continuing trend. 192 Brant Mittler, a cardiologist and attorney,
warned about the effects of Texas limits on malpractice suits: “By giving
damages to the individual, the jury is sending a message about safety to the
doctors, the nurses, the hospital: ‘Please change your ways. Make health care
safer to protect all of us.’” 193 Failing to hold the medical field accountable

190. Michael Matray, Are Federal Caps on Noneconomic Damages Possible Under a
Republican Government?, CUNNINGHAM GROUP (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.cunninghamgroup
ins.com/federal-caps-noneconomic-damages-possible-republican-government/ [https://perma.cc/
MA24-5A69]. The government will likely not take action on enacting a federal noneconomic
damage cap. In 2017, the Trump Administration voiced its support for H.R. 1215, which includes
a noneconomic damage cap of $250,000. Id. The house passed the bill and the Senate received and
referred the bill to the Committee on the Judiciary. Id. There has currently been no other action
taken on H.R. 1215.
191. Ganske, supra note 6, at 50.
192. Menaker, supra note 43.
193. Billy Corriher, In Texas, No Justice for Injured Patients, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct.
21, 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/news/2014/10/21/99402/in-texas-nojustice-for-injured-patients/ [https://perma.cc/6BQF-A7CS].
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for their deadly mistakes will not protect the hundreds of thousands of patients
that die from medical errors each year. 194
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